Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 26
Issue 2 Winter 1995 Childlaw Symposium Issue

Article 4

1995

The Juvenile Death Penalty: In the Best Interests of
the Child?
Suzanne D. Strater
Judicial Law Clerk to Hon. Thomas Cane, Court of Appeals of Wisconsin

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Juvenile Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Suzanne D. Strater, The Juvenile Death Penalty: In the Best Interests of the Child?, 26 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 147 (1995).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol26/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

The Juvenile Death Penalty: In the Best Interests
of the Child?
Suzanne D. Strater

I.

INTRODUCTION

In September 1994, eleven-year-old Robert "Yummy" Sandifer
allegedly inadvertently killed innocent, neighborhood, fourteen-yearold Shavon Dean while spraying bullets at rival gang members in
Chicago.' Prosecutors will not be asking for the death penalty during
Yummy's murder trial, as others already executed Yummy. 2 Days
after the Dean killing, Yummy was found shot to death in a pool of his
own blood.3 Two of his own gang members, ages fourteen and
sixteen, were charged with Yummy's murder.4 This shocking tale has
grabbed the attention of the country and the media, most notably
making the cover of Time magazine.5 Articles on the juvenile justice
system, 6 youth violence,7 and the crime bill8 followed. The nation's
* Presently, Suzanne Strater is a Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable Thomas Cane,
Presiding Judge, Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, for the 1994-95 term. For the 1995-96
term, she will be a Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable W. Thomas Rosemond, Jr.,
Federal Magistrate, United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois. Strater
received a B.A. in History from DePauw University in 1984 and a teaching certification
in World History, United States History, and Government from Indiana University in
1986. She received her J.D., cum laude, from Marquette University Law School in 1994.
The author wishes to acknowledge and thank Professor Christine M. Wiseman of
Marquette University Law School for her help and encouragement in the development of
this Article.
1. Nancy R. Gibbs, Murder in Miniature,TIME, Sept. 19, 1994, at 54.
2. Julie Grace, There Are No Children Here, TIME, Sept. 12, 1994, at 44.
3. Young Killers Lost Childhoods Often Carry Deadly Price, DET. FREE PRESS, Sept.
6, 1994, at 14A [hereinafter Young Killers].
4. John W. Fountain & Gary Marx, Boy's Wake a Lesson for Roseland, Mourners
Bring Kids to Learn from Tragedy, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 7, 1994, at 1; William H. Freivogel,
Murdered Boy's Story Lingers, With Messages, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Sept. 12,
1994, at 5B.
5. Gibbs, supra note 1, at 54; Richard Lacayo, When Kids Go Bad, TIME, Sept. 19,
1994, at 60.
6. Patricia Edmonds & Sam V. Meddis, Is Juvenile Justice System "Creating
Monsters"? Public Angry Over Level of Violence, USA TODAY, Sept. 28, 1994, at IA.
7. An 11-Year-Old Killer's Gangland Death, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 6, 1994, at A14;
Mary Schmich, Boy's Innocence Died Before Him, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 2, 1994, § 2, at 1.
Schmich refers to other murders committed by youth including two twelve-year-olds
killing a fifty-year-old migrant apple-picker in Washington State by shooting the
victim 18 times; a thirteen-year-old boy in New York State accused of strangling a
twelve-year-old friend; and two ten-year-old British boys beating a two-year-old to death
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reaction has varied. One editorial suggested that "we will see Robert
Sandifer time and time again, wearing the face of yet another shouldbe-child marked for death by other should-be-children who have no
respect for life because life never respected them." 9 Other authors
asserted: "With every brutal crime by a child, a troubled nation
demands longer jail sentences, tougher treatment, even the death
penalty-anything to stop the violence."'"
The latest arena for the juvenile" death penalty debate is the State of
Florida. In the last few years, Florida has experienced a rash of
slayings of foreign tourists by adolescents. 12 The killings have tarnished Florida's reputation as a vacationland, 13 and have caused the
issue of the juvenile death penalty to surface again. One highly publicized case involved four adolescents charged with killing a British
tourist.' 4 The State is presently prosecuting two of these boys as
adults.' 5 The boys were sixteen-years-old and fourteen-years-old
when charged. 6 If convicted, the sixteen-year-old may be sentenced
to death in Florida's electric chair. 7 The case raised a sociological and
with bricks and an iron bar. Id.
8. Roger E. Hernandez, It's the Crime Bill-or Nothing, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 3,
1994, at A17. The National Crime Bill instituted prevention programs and tougher
sentences for street crimes. Id. Hernandez argues that despite the crime bill, American
cities will still be unsafe. Id. He asserts that helping one troubled child at a time may be
the only answer. Id.
9. Young Killers, supra note 3, at 14A.
10. Edmonds & Meddis, supra note 6, at IA.
ii. in this discussion, as in most, "juvenile" refers to a person who is under the age
of eighteen.
12. Larry Rohter, Talk of Florida: How to End Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1994,
§ 1, at 18.
13. Id.
14. Mike Clary, Florida Youths at Center of Death-Penalty Debate: Recent Slayings
of Foreign Tourists Rekindle Discussion, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 9, 1993, at 39A;
Martin Dyckman, Cynical Scapegoating, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 26, 1993, at 9A.
As of November 1994, two of the four boys pleaded to lesser charges and are awaiting
sentencing.
Adam Yeomans, Victim Testifies in British Tourist Slaying, AP
WORLDSTREAM, Nov. 15, 1994, (International News).
15. See supra note 14. There are two procedures whereby an adult criminal court
obtains jurisdiction in juvenile cases. The first is direct filing. Under this method, a
statute requires that certain cases are always handled in adult criminal court or allows the
prosecutor to make a case-by-case determination. VICTOR L. STREm, DEATH PENALTY FOR
JUVENILES 13-14 (1987). The second alternative allows the juvenile court to waive its
jurisdiction and transfer the case to an adult criminal court. Id. For an in-depth
discussion of waiver, see S. David Kozich, Comment, A Model for the Transfer of
Juvenile Felony Offenders to Adult Court Jurisdiction,4 J. Juv. L. 170 (1980).
16. 4 Florida Teen-Agers Indicted in Death of British Tourist, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23,
1993, at A18.
17. Clary, supra note 14, at 39A. In the first trial of one of the juveniles, the
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legal debate over the juvenile death penalty. One commentator warned:
Now if you think the Brits were shocked by the shooting, just
wait until we try to fry a kid for it. Britain, in company with the
rest of Western Europe, gave up executions long ago. They've
stuck to their moral principle despite serious provocations from
the Irish Republican Army. Countries that do not execute
anyone will not easily understand how a supposedly civilized
country like the United States can undertake to execute
children.' 8
As a matter of fact, the mother of the murdered British tourist,' 9 as
well as his injured girlfriend," do not want the death penalty for these
juveniles.2 Why then, in a civilized country like America, is the death
penalty for juveniles accepted and in some cases encouraged?
The debate over the juvenile death penalty is complex. Many opponents argue that juveniles are less culpable than adults and, therefore,
should not be held to an adult standard of punishment. This Article's
analysis goes beyond the traditional criticisms of the juvenile death
penalty, such as lack of legal or moral culpability, and discusses the
conflict between a state's imposition of the juvenile death penalty and
its parenspatriae23 duty to protect children by considering their best
interests.
First, this Article traces the history of the juvenile death penalty in
the United States.24 Next, this Article outlines the present legal status
prosecutors waived the death penalty. See Yeomans, supra note 14. However, the first
trial was declared a mistrial due to jury deadlock. John Ezard, FloridaTrial Ordeal to be
Repeated, GUARDIAN, Nov. 19, 1994, (The Guardian Home Page), at 6. Florida intends to
re-prosecute the youth; his accomplice will stand trial in January of 1995. State to Seek
New Trial in Tourist Slaying, REUTERS, Nov. 19, 1994.
18. Dyckman, supra note 14, at 9A.
19. Deborah Sharp, Florida Wrestling with 'Scary' Teen Crime, USA TODAY, Oct. 7,
1993, at 3A. Sharp's article indicates that juveniles were arrested for murder or
manslaughter in 166 Florida cases in 1992. Id. Thus, in 1993, in Florida juvenile
murder arrests were up approximately 17% from 1992. Id. Consequently, considerable
outrage has resulted, including the demand for the death penalty in such cases. Id.
20. Donna O'Neal, Attack Survivor: No Death Penalty; The Slain British Tourist's
Girlfriend Says the Killers, Who Also Wounded Her in the I-10 Attack, Should Not Be
Executed, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 7, 1993, at Al.
21. Id.; Sharp, supra note 19, at 3A.
22. "Our laws, civil as well as criminal, reflect the truth that children are less
responsible for their circumstances and hence for their conduct than are adults." Hugo A.
Bedau, Foreword to STREIB, supra note 15, at viii.
23. "Parenspatriae"refers to a state's traditional role as the guardian of persons under
legal disability, such as juveniles, under which it acts to promote their welfare. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 769 (6th ed. 1990). See infra part V for further analysis of this
concept.
24. See infra part IL.
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of the juvenile death penalty by examining the constitutionality of the
death penalty in general, 25 the juvenile death penalty specifically,26 and
the legislative treatment of the death penalty, identifying minimum
statutory age limits, if any. 27 This Article then provides a brief overview of the traditional criticisms of the juvenile death penalty.28 This
Article discusses a state's broad parenspatriae'dutytoward its youths
and the "best interests of the child" standard. This discussion uses the
juvenile justice system, custody, and adoption as illustrations of the
overarching application of the parens patriae duty 29 and the best
interests of the child standard throughout juvenile law. 30 This Article
then considers a state's duty toward its youths in the context of the
juvenile death penalty. 3' This Article ultimately concludes that the
juvenile death penalty directly conflicts with a state's duty to protect
children. Accordingly, this Article urges state legislators, in considering whether to enact juvenile death penalty legislation, and the
United States Supreme Court, in determining
the constitutionality of
32
such legislation, to consider this conflict.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE JUVENILE
DEATH PENALTY

The rationale for the juvenile death penalty is often traced to Blackstone's Commentarieson the Laws of England,3 3 which articulated the
common law impact of age on the death penalty. 34 According to
interpretations of Blackstone's theories, juveniles below the age of
seven were incapable of forming criminal intent, and a rebuttable presumption of incapacity applied to individuals aged seven to fourteen. The law presumed that children fourteen or older had the same criminal
capacity as adults.36
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
3 1.
32.

See infra part III.A.
See infra part III.B.
See infra part'III.C.
See infra part IV.
See infra part V.A-B.
See infra part V.A-B.
See infra part V.C.
See infra parts V-VI.

33. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES.

34. 4 id. at *22-24.
35. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 864-78 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia provides a cursory analysis of the historical perspective of the juvenile
death penalty in his dissent. Id. at 859-78 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
36. ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 936 (1982). For
additional information on the history of the juvenile death penalty, see Victor L. Streib,
Death Penalty for Children: The American Experience with Capital Punishment for
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The first known execution of a youth under the age of eighteen, on
what later became American soil, took place in Plymouth Colony in
1642, 37 over a century before the adoption of the Eighth Amendment.38 The youngest offender ever executed under the United States
Constitution was James Arcene, a ten-year-old Cherokee, who was
hanged in Arkansas in 1885 for participating in a robbery and a
murder.39 In the twentieth century, prior'to Furman v. Georgia,4 °
which found capital punishment unconstitutional as it was then
applied,4 ' approximately 175 adolescents were executed.42 Since the
Court ruled in 1976 that the death penalty is not per se unconstitutional,43 110 additional children have been sentenced to death."
By the 1990s, approximately 287 juveniles had been executed for
criminal offenses in the United States. 45 Nearly two-thirds of the
juvenile executions took place in the South.46 All but nine of the
adolescents executed were male. 47 Furthermore, three-fourths of the
juveniles executed were people of color.48 Overwhelmingly, their
victims were white.49

Crimes Committed While Under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 613, 614-36 (1983).
37. For an analysis of this case and other early case studies, see STREIB, supra note
15, at 73-94.
38. The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII. For a discussion of the Eighth Amendment in relation to the death penalty,
see infra part II1.A.
39. History of the Juvenile Death Penalty; Key Events in the United States, WASH.
POST, July 19, 1988, (Health), at ZI5.
40. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (5-4 decision).
41. Id. at 240 (per curiam).
42. Etta J. Mullin, Note, At What Age Should They Die? The United States Supreme
Court Decision with Respect to Juvenile Offenders and the Death Penalty, Stanford v.
Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1990), 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV.
161, 163-64 (1990).
43. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (plurality opinion); id. at 207
(White, J., concurring).
44. Charles Z. Smith, The Death Penalty and Juveniles, 2 KY. CHILDREN'S RTS. J. 1, 5
tbl. 1 (1992).
45. Id. at 10. See also Linda Andre-Wells, Note, Imposing the Death Penalty Upon
Juvenile Offenders: A Current Application of the Eighth Amendment's Prohibition
Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 21 N.M. L. REV. 373, 375 (1991) (giving
additional statistical information).
46. Georgia has had the most juvenile executions at 40, followed by North Carolina,
Ohio, and Virginia, each with 19 juvenile executions. Don Colburn, Most Put to Death
for Juvenile Offenses Are Black Males, WASH. POST, July 19, 1988, (Health), at Z16.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. Approximately 89% of all victims have been white. Id.
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Even though juvenile executions have taken place in our country's
history, many authorities characterize the actual enforcement of the
juvenile death penalty as rare,5" especially in comparison to adult death
penalty cases.51 Societal interest in the juvenile death penalty,
however, has recently revived,52 and the constitutional and legal
ramifications of the juvenile death penalty remain in dispute. The next
section of this analysis will trace the Supreme Court's evaluation of the
death penalty in general, and will then focus specifically on the
application of capital punishment to minors.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY
A. The Constitutionalityof the Death Penalty
Although a thorough examination of the constitutionality of the
death penalty is beyond the scope of this analysis, a brief introduction
is necessary in order to place the juvenile death penalty in context. The
framework for analyzing the general constitutionality of the death
penalty originates with the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, made applicable to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.53 The Eighth Amendment bans
the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. 54 Originally, the
framers of the Eighth Amendment only intended to outlaw the
torturous punishments practiced in sixteenth through eighteenth-century England; they did not necessarily intend to proscribe punishments
disproportionate to the crime.:
At the turn of the twentieth century, in Weems v. United States,56
the Supreme Court expanded the historical interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment. The Weems Court stated that the Eighth Amendment "is
50. Mullin, supra note 42, at 161.
5 1. Smith, supra note 44, at 4.
52. See supra notes 1-23 and accompanying text.
53. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667-68 (1962) (applying the Eighth
Amendment to the states, via the Fourteenth Amendment, for the first time). It is now
well established that the Eighth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296-97 (1991).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See supra note 38 for the text of the Eighth
Amendment.
55. Gregory Bassham, Rethinking the Emerging Jurisprudence of Juvenile Death, 5
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 467, 468 (1991).
56. 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (striking down a sentence of 15 years imprisonment for
surveillance and tampering with documents as cruel and unusual punishment). The
defendant charged with surveillance and tampering was an officer of the Bureau of the
Coast Guard and Transportation of the United States Government of the Philippine
Islands; thus, he was sentenced in the Philippines. Id. at 357.
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not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice.""7 In 1958, the Supreme
Court focused on this broader analysis and implemented a definition of
"cruel and unusual" which looked to "evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."'5 8
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,59 the Court directly addressed the
issue of the death penalty as cruel and unusual punishment, in the
context of determining the constitutionality of the capital punishment
statutes of Georgia and Texas.6° In a per curiam opinion, with five
separate concurrences, the Court concluded that the death penalty, as
then applied, was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and, thus, unconstitutional. 6' The
Court did not decide, however, that the death penalty was unconstitutional for all crimes, under all circumstances.62
Four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia,63 the Court held that the
imposition of the death penalty did not constitute a per se Eighth
Amendment violation 64 and found a revised statutory scheme constitutional.65 Since the Gregg ruling, executions have numbered thirty to
forty per year, and the national death row population was expected to
be approximately 2948 by the end of 1994.66 This population is the
largest number of people on death row in any nation's history.67

57. Id. at 378.
58. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (invalidating a sentence of
denaturalization for wartime desertion).
59. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (5-4 decision).
60. Id. at 239-40 (per curiam). The Court consolidated Furman with Branch v. Texas,
a case appealed from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Id.
6 1. Id. (per curiam). In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart stated: "[T]he Eight
and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under
legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly
imposed." Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Douglas, in his concurring
opinion, determined that the "evolving standards of decency" test was the benchmark for
defining cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 242 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
62. Streib, supra note 36, at 632.
63. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
64. Streib, supra note 36, at 632-33.
65. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190-98 (plurality opinion), for a summary of this scheme.
66. David A. Kaplan, Death Be Not Proud at the Court, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 7, 1994, at
52; Tony Mauro & Mark Potok, Death Penalty Becoming "Real" / 6 Had Been Scheduled
This Week, USA TODAY, Dec. 7, 1994, at 3A.
67. Kaplan, supra note 66, at 52.
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B. The Constitutionalityof the Juvenile Death Penalty
Although the Court avoided the issue by deciding the case on
different grounds,68 the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty
came before the Supreme Court for the first time in Eddings v.
Oklahoma.69 The Court, however, emphasized age as a mitigating
factor in the sentencing of capital crimes.70 Six years later, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of the juvenile death penalty in its
decision in Thompson v. Oklahoma.7 ' In a plurality decision,72 the
Court reversed a fifteen-year-old's death sentence using the evolving
standards of decency test set forth in Trop v. Dulles.73 Under this test,
the Court analyzed contemporary values as reflected by state statutes
and sentencing juries, finding that our civilized society rejects the
application of the death penalty to a fifteen-year-old.74
Ironically, just one-and-one-half years later, in Stanford v.
Kentucky, 75 the Court also looked to state statutes in formulating its
holding that society has not rejected the application of the death penalty
to sixteen and seventeen-year-olds.76 In Stanford, the Court again
analyzed the juvenile death penalty in relation to evolving standards of
decency and statutory enactments,77 concluding that no such national
68. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982). The Oklahoma trial court did
not take mitigating circumstances into consideration in sentencing; therefore, the
Supreme Court reversed the sentence and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at
116-17.
69. Id. at 104.
70. Id. at 116.
71. 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion).
72. The Thompson Court did not reach a majority opinion in determining the
constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty. See id. at 815 (plurality opinion). The
four justice plurality opinion held that imposing the death penalty on a child under
sixteen is "unconstitutional punishment." Id. at 838 (plurality opinion). Justice
O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which she agreed with the ultimate decision of
the plurality, but found that the information before the Court was inadequate to decide,
based on the evolving standards of decency test, whether the death penalty for children
under sixteen was unconstitutional. Id. at 848-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The
three-justice dissent found that the juvenile death penalty was not unconstitutional. Id.
at 859 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 821 (plurality opinion) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)).
74. Id. at 821-23 (plurality opinion). The Thompson Court did not ban the juvenile
death penalty altogether, rather the Court banned the juvenile death penalty for those
under the age of sixteen. Id. at 838 (plurality opinion).
75. 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (plurality opinion). The Court consolidated Stanford with
Wilkins v. Missouri. Id. at 366 (plurality opinion).
76. Id. at 370-71 (plurality opinion). Most of Justice Scalia's opinion constituted
the opinion of the Court, however, parts IV.B and V constitute only a plurality opinion
of the Court. Id. at 364.
77. Id. at 369 (plurality opinion). The Court also applied a traditional common law
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consensus against capital punishment existed for youths aged sixteen
and seventeen.78 The Court rejected various opinion polls, as well as
the positions of a number of professional associations, which contended that public attitude opposed capital punishment for juveniles.79
The Stanford holding leaves many questions unanswered, including
the constitutionality of statutes allowing the execution of those under
the age of sixteen. Taken together, however, Thompson and Stanford
seem to comprise one rule: the line between juveniles and adults for
the purpose of imposing the death penalty is age sixteen. 80 Legislative
enactments and the issues surrounding them follow in the section
below.
C. Legislative Treatment of the Juvenile Death Penalty
Currently, thirty-seven states have enacted the death penalty for
adults.8 ' Thus, only thirteen states and the District of Columbia prohibit capital punishment altogether. 82 Of the thirty-seven states that
allow capital punishment, twenty-four permit the imposition of the
death penalty on juveniles.83 Fourteen of these states have set a
minimum age for capital punishment,84 including North Carolina at
analysis of whether this punishment was cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights
was adopted. The Court concluded that the death penalty for juveniles did not contravene
this test. Id. at 368 (plurality opinion) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*23-24). Furthermore, Justice Scalia found statutes setting the legal age for other
activities such as driving, voting, and drinking alcohol, irrelevant. Id. at 374-75
(plurality opinion).
78. Id. at 373 (plurality opinion). There is more at work here than the age difference
between fifteen-year-olds and sixteen or seventeen-year-olds. The change in the Court's
attitude may be explained by the shift in members of the Court and by Justice
O'Connor's swing vote. The Thompson decision was a four-Justice plurality, which
included Justice O'Connor's deciding vote on narrower grounds. Thompson, 487 U.S. at
818 (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy did not take part in the decision; thus there
were only three dissenters. Id. (plurality opinion). In the Stanford decision, Justice
O'Connor's fifth vote on narrower grounds tipped the scale. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380
(plurality opinion). There were a total of four dissenters in Stanford. Id. (plurality
opinion).
79. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377-78 (plurality opinion).
80. Clifford K. Dome & Kenneth E. Gewerth, Imposing the Death Penalty on Juvenile
Murderers: A ConstitutionalAssessment, 75 JUDICATURE 6, 8-9 (1991).
8 1. See infra app. A for a listing of state statutes. Moreover, on Tuesday, March 7,
1995, New York became the thirty-eight state to enact the death penalty for adults. N.Y.
Brings Back Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 7, 1995, at 1 (evening update). The law
currently awaits codification. Whether the law permits the imposition of the death
penalty on juveniles is unknown.
82. See Smith, supra note 44, at 2-4.
83. See infra app. A. These include states that explicitly allow the death penalty for
juveniles and those in which no minimum age has been established.
84. These states include Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
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fourteen,85 Louisiana at fifteen,86 and Arkansas at fourteen.87 Ten of
the twenty-four states allowing juvenile capital punishment do not set a
minimum age for the death penalty.88
The unconstitutionality of some of these state statutes may seem
clear from the earlier discussion of Supreme Court decisions. 89 Nevertheless, prosecutors are seeking the death penalty in cases involving
children under the age of sixteen,9 ° apparently arguing that the law is
not settled based on the lack of a majority opinion in Thompson v.
Oklahoma.9'
In addition to prosecutors seeking the death penalty for children, the
public is lobbying for tougher state criminal laws, evidencing some
public support for the juvenile death penalty.92 Prior to the Florida
Supreme Court's decision in Allen v. State,9 3 Florida legislators
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, Virginia, and
Wyoming. See infra app. A.
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1994). The North Carolina death penalty statute allows
the death penalty for fourteen-year-olds who are convicted of a murder that occurred while
they were already incarcerated for a previous murder. Id.
86. LA. CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. art. 305, as amended by Act of July 6, 1994, 1994 La.
Sess. Law Serv. 15 (West) (requiring a juvenile to be transferred to adult court when he or
she has reached the age of fifteen and there is probable cause to believe that he or she
committed first or second degree murder).
87. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1994) (allowing transfer to
adult court at age fourteen for a capital murder offense).
88. These states include the following: Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Montana,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington. See infra app. A
for the citations to these state statutes.
89. See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
90. Lynne Bumpus-Hooper, What Age Is Old Enough to Be Killed? Death Penaltyfor
Young Teens Is Unconstitutional, Experts Say, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Feb. 7, 1993,
at A16; Dyckman, supra note 14, at 39A; see also Dennis Wagner, Suspect's Mom Cites
System in Slaying: Juvenile Officials Didn't Detain Son, Court Told, PHOENIX GAZETrE,
Aug. 6, 1994, at B 1 (discussing case in which Arizona prosecutor may seek the death
penalty for a sixteen-year-old homicide suspect).
91. 487 U.S. 815 (1988). See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Thompson.
92. Keith A. Harriston, D.C. Referendum Fueled by Fear, Leaders Say Crime-Weary
Voters May Support Death Penalty, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1992, at Al; see also No
Death Sentence For Anyone Younger Than 16, Court Says, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 25,
1994, at 6B (discussing Florida Supreme Court's ruling that the death sentence cannot be
imposed on anyone under sixteen in a case involving an eighteen-year-old who was
fifteen when the crime was committed); Rorie Sherman, Juvenile Judges Say: Time to
Get Tough, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 8, 1994, at Al (explaining an August 1994 poll taken of
250 juvenile judges, in which two out of every five opined that there are situations under
which juveniles should face capital punishment).
93. 636 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1994) (per curiam). The Florida Supreme Court held that the
death penalty violated the state constitution when applied to children under sixteen. Id.
at 497. See infra notes 166-72 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of this
case.
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debated a bill that would have allowed the execution of children as
young as fourteen.94 Additionally, Congress' latest crime bill reflects
the public's desire for tougher criminal laws: the bill enlarges the total
number of capital federal crimes by sixty and limits the number of
appeals for death row inmates.95 Furthermore, in November 1993,
congressional opposition forced Senator Paul Simon of Illinois to
withdraw a proposed amendment to the crime bill that would have
banned the death penalty for juvenile offenders.96
Meanwhile, despite this support for the juvenile death penalty, the
opposition to the juvenile death penalty has also become more vocal.97
The next section of this Article will explore some of the traditional
rationales against the juvenile death penalty, highlighting the arguments of the most active children's advocates and anti-death penalty
forces.
IV. TRADITIONAL CRITICISM OF THE JUVENILE

DEATH PENALTY

One of the most vocal opponents of the death penalty, and the
juvenile death penalty specifically, is the human rights organization,
Amnesty International. 8 According to Amnesty International, in the
last five years only seven countries, including the United States, have
94. Rohter, supra note 12, at 18.
95. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1796 (1994). The federal crime bill expanded the availability of the death
penalty to persons convicted of civil rights murders, rape and child molestation murders,
sexual exploitation of children, and murder of federal witnesses, to name a few. Id.
§§ 60001-60026; see also Ana Puga, House Votes to Limit Amendments During Crime
Bill Battle, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 14, 1994, at 5 (discussing bill to expand the death
penalty to cover more crimes, and to limit the number of appeals allowed for death row
inmates); Ana Puga, Death-Penalty Guidelines in Federal Crimes Debated, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 8, 1994, at 6 (explaining that the anti-crime bill before Congress creates
60 new crimes punishable by the death penalty). Puga points out that the federal
government has not executed anyone since 1963. Id.
96. Ana Puga, Senators Withdraw Disputed Crime Bill Amendments, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 16, 1993, at 5.
97. See infra part IV.
98. Amnesty International was founded in London in 1961 and has since become a
worldwide advocate of human rights. Brief for Amicus Curiae Amnesty International in
Support of Petitioner at 2, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (No. 866169). In February 1987, Amnesty International started a worldwide campaign to
abolish the death penalty. Id. at 3. Amnesty International's stance was clear:
"Amnesty International does not approve of and would not defend any violent crime.
[Amnesty International] cannot regard the death penalty-particularly as applied to
crimes committed by juvenile offenders-other than as cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment and incompatible with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person."
Id. at 4 (footnote omitted).

158

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 26

executed people for committing crimes while under the age of eighteen:
Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. 99 Amnesty
International has relentlessly opposed the recent demand for the application of the death penalty in juvenile cases.'0
Another vocal opponent of the juvenile death penalty is the United
Nations. The United Nations General Assembly expressed its disapproval of the juvenile death penalty through the Convention on the
Rights of the Child.'' As early as 1977, the United States signed two
99. See Robert A. Jordan, A Cry for Death-To the Death Penalty, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 23, 1994, (Focus), at 71. The comparison of the United States to Third World
countries is intentional and surfaces in many criticisms of the juvenile death penalty in
this country. See, e.g., Ved P. Nanda, The United States Reservation to the Ban on the
Death Penalty for Juvenile Offenders: An Appraisal Under the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAuL L. REV. 1311, 1333 (1993); Jason Berry,
Executions: A Costly Way to Fight Crime, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 21, 1993,
(Perspective), at 8D.
100. In an open letter to President Clinton in early January 1994, Amnesty
International maintained that there was "ample, well-documented evidence that the death
penalty is arbitrary, unfair and racially discriminatory; that it is imposed on those
without adequate legal counsel, on juvenile offenders and on the mentally ill and
retarded." Jordan, supra note 99, at 71. Less than two months later, in his dissent to a
denial of certiorari, Justice Blackman stated a similar rationale for his opposition to the
death penalty in general. He declared:
Twenty years have passed since this Court declared that the death penalty must
be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all . ..and,
despite the effort of the States and courts to devise legal formulas and
procedural rules to meet this daunting challenge, the death penalty remains
fraught with arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice, and mistake.
Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1129 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
Furthermore, Amnesty International asserted:
[T]here exists a well developed, unequivocal international legal and moral
consensus prohibiting all nations from executing children for their crimes.
However heinous the crime, the imposition on a young person of a sentence of
utmost cruelty, which denies the possibility of rehabilitation or reform, is
contrary to contemporary standards of justice and humane treatment.
Brief for Amicus Curiae Amnesty International In Support of Petitioner at 5, Thompson,
487 U.S. 815 (No. 86-6169). Other amici briefs in support of the petitioner reflect the
widespread opposition to the juvenile death penalty. The organizations submitting
briefs included: Office of the State Appellate Defender of Illinois, the American Bar
Association, National Legal Aid and Defender Association, The American Jewish
Committee, American Society for Adolescent Psychiatry, The American
Orthopsychiatric Association, International Human Rights Law Group, Child Welfare
League of America, National Network of Runaway and Youth Services, and Defense for
Children International-USA. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 818 (plurality opinion).
101. G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/25 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448,
1456-76 (1989), addendum in 29 I.L.M. 1340 (1990). Article 37(a) of this document
states: "No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without
possibility of release shall be imposed for offenses committed by persons below
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treaties which banned juvenile capital punishment, but the Senate never
ratified these treaties. 0 2 While the United States recently became one
of the 177 signatories to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the
Senate has not yet ratified it.'0 3
The leading legal authority and strong opponent of the juvenile death
penalty is Professor Victor Streib.' ° Professor Streib contends that,
even after attempting to maintain the stance of an objective researcher,
his discoveries repeatedly lead him to the flaws of the juvenile death
penalty. 10 5 Professor Streib has criticized the deterrence rationale put
Id. art. 37(a). For a comprehensive analysis of the juvenile
eighteen years of age .
justice system as it relates to this treaty, see Jennifer D. Tinkler, The Juvenile Justice
System in the United States and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 469 (1992). For a well presented introduction to this
document, see KAY CASTELLE, IN THE CHILD'S BEST INTEREST:
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OFTHE CHILD (3d ed. 1990).

A PRIMER ON THE U.N.

102. Spare the Kids, NEWSDAY, Oct. 17, 1991, at 56. The President of the United
States has the power to sign treaties, but the treaties are not the law without Senate
ratification. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Therefore, the signing of the treaty did not
affect the state death penalty statutes. The Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights actually found the United States in violation of international human rights law in
regard to the South Carolina case of juvenile James Terry Roach. David Weissbrodt,
Execution of Juvenile Offenders by the United States Violates InternationalHuman
Rights Law, 3 AM. U. J.INT'L L. & POL'Y 339, 339-40 (1988).
103. On Thursday, February 16, 1995 Madeleine Albright, the United States delegate
to the United Nations, signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child. U.S. Signs
UN Pact on Children's Rights, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 17, 1995, at NI 1. The treaty currently
awaits ratification by the Senate. See U.S. CONST. art. 1I,§ 2, cl. 2. Moreover, of the
177 signatories to the Convention only 169 have ratified it. U.S. Finally Agrees to
Sign UN Accord for Children, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 12, 1995, at C22.
104. Professor Streib is a professor of Law at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law,
Cleveland State University, and is considered the foremost authority on the juvenile
death penalty. MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY, Practice Profiles Section (1994).

He received his undergraduate degree from Auburn University and his Juris Doctorate
from Indiana University-Bloomington School of Law. Id. Before becoming a Criminal
Justice and Procedure instructor at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Professor Streib
taught Forensic Studies at Indiana University. Id. Professor Streib has written over one
hundred papers, articles, and books on the juvenile death penalty and has represented or
appeared on behalf of juvenile defendants in many high profile cases, including those of
William Wayne Thompson and Jerome Allen. Andre-Wells, supra note 45, at 375 n.21.
See supra notes 71-74 for a complete discussion of Thompson, 487 U.S. 815 (1988),
and infra notes 166-72 for a complete discussion of Allen v. State, 636 So. 2d 494 (Fla.
1994) (per curiam).
105. STREIB, supra note 15, at ix. Streib is not alone in his assertion that the
juvenile death penalty is flawed. In his Stanford opinion, Justice Brennan declared that
the deterrence rationale for the juvenile death penalty was misplaced, reasoning that
juveniles have little fear of death. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 404-05 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). His dissenting opinion further reflects his outrage at the juvenile death
penalty as "'nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering."' Id. at 405 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 592 (1977)).
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forth by proponents of the juvenile death penalty, °6 suggesting that
execution may actually be a less effective deterrent than life
imprisonment because of the nature of juvenile offenders.0 7 Professor Streib also contends that political leaders use the juvenile death
penalty as a panacea to teenage violence and crime, hindering the
search for a real solution to these problems.' 8 Finally, Professor
Streib notes that children are treated differently in the juvenile justice
system, than adults are treated in the adult justice system.1°9
Although most opponents of the juvenile death penalty look to moral
justifications for their opinions, Professor Streib, in his documentation
of the premise that children should be afforded special treatment,
touches on a state's position with respect to children in other areas of
the law. This focus is the basis of the central argument of this Article:
a state's parenspatriaeor quasi-parental role toward children is inconsistent with the juvenile death penalty. 10
V. THE STATE AS PARENS PATRIAE AND THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

In addition to traditional arguments against the juvenile death
penalty, the conflict between a state's duty as parenspatriaeto protect
children on the one hand, and its role in executing children on the
other, provides another reason why there should be no capital punishment of children. One commentator described the concept of parens

106. For a comprehensive analysis of both the retributive and deterrence rationales,
see Edward Miller, Note, Executing Minors and the Mentally Retarded: The Retribution
and Deterrence Rationales, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 15 (1990). See also Sherri A. Carver,
Note, Retribution-A Justificationfor the Execution of Mentally Retarded and Juvenile
Murderers, 16 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 155 (1991) (defending the retribution theory).
107. Clarence Page, We Should Outlaw Capital Punishment in Juvenile Cases, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 30, 1987, (Perspective), at 15. The article quotes Professor Streib:
[Children] do not think like adults. . . . They think in mischievous or evil
ways sometimes, but they tend more often than adults to act from impulse, not
understanding the consequences of their acts. And if you threaten them with
death, they may not know fully what that means, either. They may even be
attracted by the idea of death, the sense of flirting with danger. But there is
one thing we know: We know they don't like to be locked up. The idea of
being cooped up for life scares youngsters. It really scares them.
Id.
108. John D. McKinnon, Can the Law Put a 13-Year-Old in Electric Chair?, MIAMI
HERALD,

Oct. 6, 1993, at B1.

109. STREIB, supra note 15, at 3.
110. Professor Streib delineates the age of eighteen as the common line between the
protected status of children and the punishable status of an adult. STREIB, supra note 15,
at 20.
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patriaeas:
[D]eclar[ing] the state to be the ultimate guardian of every
child. Under this doctrine, with its great emphasis on the
correlation of the welfare of the child with the welfare of the
state, the state has not only the right, but the duty to establish
standards for a child's care."'

A state's parenspatriae authority is based on the premise that children
are qualitatively different from adults." l2 Because juveniles are generally presumed not to have the ability to care for themselves, they are
subject to the control of their parents and the State through its role as
parens patriae.13 In all areas of juvenile law, other than that of
juvenile capital punishment, a state carries out its parenspatriae duty
by considering the best interests of the child. Ultimately, the parens
patriae notion and the best interests of the child standard must be
applied in the context of the juvenile death penalty. Because execution
I 11. Mary V. Dobson, The Juvenile Court and Parental Rights, 4 FAM. L.Q. 393, 396
(1970).
The Supreme Court explained the origins of parens patriae in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967):
The phrase was taken from chancery practice, where ... it was used to describe
the power of the state to act in loco parentis for the purpose of protecting the
property interests and the person of the child. But there is no trace of the
doctrine in the history of criminal jurisprudence.
Id. at 16 (footnote omitted).
112. In Thompson, the Supreme Court explained:
The assemblage of statutes . . . , from both Oklahoma and other States, reflects
this basic assumption that our society makes about children as a class; we
assume that they do not yet act as adults do, and thus we act in their interest by
restricting certain choices that we feel they are not yet ready to make with full
benefit of the costs and benefits attending such decision.
487 U.S. at 825 n.23 (plurality opinion). The American Bar Association described the
fundamental differences between children and adults as follows: "Our society recognizes
that minors are less mature, less experienced, less able to exercise good judgment and
self-restraint, more susceptible to environmental influence (both positive and
negative), and as a result, less responsible and less culpable in a moral sense than
adults." Brief of Amicus Curiae The American Bar Association at 3, Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (No. 86-6169). As Professor Streib contends that
"[c]hildren are significantly different from adults and simply cannot be shuttled
mindlessly into adult legal processes." STREIB, supra note 15, at 3. For a discussion of
the evolution of Western society's view of the child's role, see AMERICAN CHILDHOOD: A
RESEARCH GUIDE AND HISTORICAL HANDBOOK (J. Hawes & N. Hiner eds., 1985);
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979); Judith G. McMullen,
Privacy, Family Autonomy, and the Maltreated Child, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 569, 575-81
(1992). Professor McMullen's article focuses on the balance between family autonomy
and the role of the parent versus state intervention. McMullen, supra, at 569. She
concludes that assumptions of family autonomy do not always work in the best interests
of the child. Id. at 598.
113. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984); see supra note 23 and
accompanying text.
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is not in the best interests of the juvenile offender, a state fails in its
parenspatriaerole when it sentences a juvenile to death.
A. A State's Broad Duty to Protect Children: Juvenile
Justice, Custody, and Adoption
Although this Article cannot discuss every area concerning children
and the law, this section provides three examples of proceedings in
which children are at issue, and demonstrates a state's role as parens
patriaein each of those proceedings. This section also explains that
the best interests of the child are a primary consideration in each proceeding, supporting the conclusion that the best interests of the child
must also be considered in a determination of the validity of the
juvenile death penalty.
1. The Juvenile Justice System
The late-nineteenth century Progressive Movement reflected
society's changing cultural perspectives on children." 4 The Progressives advocated child centered, rehabilitative policies that reflected the
ideological assumptions of positivism." 5 These rehabilitative ideals
ushered in the juvenile court movement. The first juvenile justice
system was created in Chicago in 1899.'16 By 1925, all but two states
had enacted juvenile justice legislation." 7 In 1938, the federal government enacted juvenile justice legislation, known as the Federal Juvenile
Delinquency Act."18
The Progressives envisioned the juvenile court system as one which
would achieve benevolent goals for the child and, in the process,
foster a better society. "9 Accordingly, the goals of the juvenile justice
system included rehabilitating juveniles and protecting society. 12 The
juvenile courts, under states' parens patriae authority, emphasized
114. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
115. Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment,
Treatment, and the Difference it Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 824 (1988). The author

defines positivism as "the effort to identify the antecedent variables that cause crime and
deviance-challeng[ing] the classic formulations of crime as the product of conscious
free-will choices." Id. at 824 (footnote omitted).
116.

SAMUEL L. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES § 1.1, at 1-1 (2d ed. 1985); STREIB, supra

note 15, at 4.
117. Gault, 387 U.S. at 14-15; VICTOR L. STREIB, JUVENILE JUSTICE INAMERICA 6
(1978).
118. Pub. L. No. 666, 52 Stat. 764 (1938). For a cursory look at the beginnings of
the juvenile justice system, see SOL RUBIN, LAW OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 1-2 (1976).
119. Feld, supra note 115, at 824.
120. Mullin, supra note 42, at 164.
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2
treatment of juvenile offenders over. punishment. '
Commentators have rationalized a state's role as parenspatriaein the
context of the juvenile justice system by suggesting that a state's role is
to aid, not to punish, juvenile offenders, because juvenile crime is
caused by society's failures. 122 This rationale is consistent with positivism, which attributes criminal behavior to external forces, thus
reducing the actor's moral responsibility
and consequently focusing on
23
reform, rather than punishment. 1
The juvenile justice system has changed dramatically over the last
century, moving away from progressive ideals, including most notably
that of rehabilitation. 124 Nevertheless, the basis of the system remains
clear: a state, through its juvenile justice system, must work to protect
and to rehabilitate juvenile offenders by balancing the best interests of
the juvenile and of society as a whole.2 5 Although beyond a precise
definition, the best interest
of the child standard holds the child's
' 26

interest "paramount."'

121. Feld, supra note 115, at 824.
122. Lawrence A. Vanore, Note, The Decency of Capital Punishment for Minors:
Contemporary Standards and the Dignity of Juveniles, 61 IND. L.J. 757, 770-71 (1986).
Vanore states: "That the state should take this role is supported by the widely held view
that juvenile crime results from environmental factors for which society must share the
blame; it is therefore inappropriate to punish youthful transgressors for crimes that are
the result of society's failures." Id.
123. Feld, supra note 115, at 824.
124. See generally Barry C. Feld, CriminalizingJuvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure
for the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L. REV. 141 (1984) (containing a historical background
of the juvenile justice system).
125. The legislative intent behind the Wisconsin Children's Code, which governs
the Wisconsin juvenile justice system, illustrates the State's parens patriae role:
(1) (a) To provide judicial and other procedures through which children and all
other interested parties are assured fair hearings and their constitutional and
other legal rights are recognized and enforced, while protecting the public
safety.
(2) The best interests of the child shall always be of paramount consideration,
but the court shall also consider the interest of the parents or guardian of the
child ...

and the interests of the public.

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.01 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994) (emphasis added). Chapter 48 of
the Wisconsin Code also addresses adoption issues. Id. § 48.
It has been argued that the juvenile justice system is asked to do what parents, school
systems, and communities will not or cannot do. STREIB, supra note 15, at 16. This
debate is beyond the scope of this analysis, but nonetheless thought provoking.
126. Kirsten Kom, Comment, The Struggle for the Child: Preserving the Family in
Adoption Disputes Between Biological Parents and Third Parties, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1279,
1319 (1994). The best interests standard developed via the doctrine of parens patriae.
See generally Lisa M. Fitzgibbon, Note, Campbell v. Campbell: Requiring Adherence
to the Correct Legal Standard in Child Custody Proceedings-The "Best Interest of the
Child," 45 ME. L. REV. 471 (1993) (explaining the best interests of the child standard as
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2. Child Custody
Another area of juvenile law in which a state has a parens patriae
duty is child custody. Specifically, the best interests of the child standard, when used by family court judges to make custody decisions,
places a state in a fiduciary role in which it acts for the benefit of the
child.' 27 As represented by the judge, a state has the right and the duty
to control the custody
of a minor as it believes appropriate for the
28
welfare.
child's
For many years, courts usually granted custody to the mother of a
child based on societal roles and stereotypes. 29 It was not until the
late 1970s that attitudes regarding custody changed and courts began to
use the best interests of the child standard.13 ° Four developments led
to the adoption of the best interests of the child standard in custody
cases: (1) the ascent of no-fault divorce; (2) the entry of women into
the labor force; (3) the motivation for legal equality of the sexes; and
(4) the attitudinal change toward the father's role in child rearing.' 3 '
These societal developments led to more court discretion when
granting custody. 32 Thus, the best interests of the child standard
began its evolution.
Because of the transformation in attitudes toward child custody and
the consequential change in court decisions concerning custodial placement, legislators amended many state statutes to require courts to consider the best interests of the child. 33 Some of these statutes simply
require courts to consider a child's best interests, while others list
specific factors courts should consider in making a best interests
it developed in Maine).
127. A fiduciary is "[a] person having duty, created by his undertaking, to act
primarily for another's benefit in matters connected with such undertaking." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990). The best interests of the child standard is the
predominant custody standard in most American jurisdictions. See, e.g., Kohl v.
Murphy, 767 F. Supp. 895, 903 n.8 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (stating that the major factor in all
child custody cases is the best interest of the child); McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F.
Supp. 318, 324 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 876 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting that most
states direct custody considerations to be made in the best interest of the child); In re
D.I.S. for the Adoption of S.A.O., 494 A.2d 1316, 1322 (D.C. 1985) (finding that the
best interests of the child standard for custody is well established).
128. Fitzgibbon, supra note 126, at 473.
129. Andrew Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative Custody
After Divorce, 64 TEx. L. REV. 687, 696 (1985).
130. Id. at 696-97.
131. Id. at 697.
132. Julie A. Stiles, Nineteenth-Century Child Custody Reform: Maternal Authority
and the Development of the "Best Interests of the Child" Standard, 6 PROB. L.J. 5, 12
(1984).
133. Schepard, supra note 129, at 700-01.
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determination.' 34 Some statutes provide for joint custody if it is in the
child's best interest, defining the child's interest in terms of the benefit
from an ongoing relationship with both parents.'35 Under other states'
statutes, judges examine criteria such as a child's relationship with his
or her parents, as well as the child's current adjustment to his or her
home. 136 Also, when appropriate, courts will take into consideration
1
the child's reasonable preference. 13
In examining the various factors
that comprise a best interests determination, a state takes38on the role of
a quasi-parent or fiduciary acting on behalf of the child.
134. Schepard, supra note 129, at 700-01. Michigan's Child Custody Act is an
example of the latter type of statute. The statute supplies a laundry list of factors that
guide a court:
"[B]est interests of the child" means the sum total of the following factors to
be considered, evaluated, and determined by the court:
(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties
involved and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love,
affection and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in
his or her religion or creed, if any.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child
with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and
permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other
material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
home or homes.
(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child to be
of sufficient age to express preference.
(j) The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage
a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the
other parent or the child and the parents.
(k) Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed against
or witnessed by the child.
(1)Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child
custody dispute.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994). These factors reflect a
court's need to protect the psychological and physical well-being of the child.
135. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080 (West 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46B56A (West 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 518.17 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994).
136. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 5/602 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
137. See, e.g., id.; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23(i) (West Supp. 1994).
138. Judge Cardozo articulated the judge's role in a New York State custody suit: "He
acts as parens patriaeto do what is best for the interest of the child. He is to put himself
in the position of a 'wise, affectionate, and careful parent' and make provision for the
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3. Adoption
A state's duty and role as protector, and the best interests of the
child standard, permeate adoption law as well as custody law. 3 9 The
best interests standard for adoption is analogous to that of child
custody: "The child placement system in the United States is governed
by the best interests principle: that intervention and placement or other
disposition should be carried out only to further the best interests of
the affected child."' 4 As in custody cases, trial courts are asked to
consider various factors, such as the child's wishes, welfare, health,
and relationships with relatives, when making a discretionary determination for the child's welfare and adoption. 14' After termination of

child accordingly." Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. 1925) (citing Queen v.
Gyngall, 2 Q.B. Div'l Ct. 232, 238 (1893)).
139. Note that before the court can apply the best interests of the child standard, the
court must first terminate the biological parents' rights by making a finding that the
parents relinquished their rights or that they are unfit. Naomi R. Cahn, Family Bonds:
Adoption and the Politics of Parenting, 61 U. CHi. L. REV. 325, 326 (1994) (book
review); see, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.41-.415 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); see Korn,
supra note 126, at 1280-81.
140. Margaret Howard, Transracial Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interests
Standard,59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 503 (1984).
141. The Illinois Adoption Act is illustrative. The factors considered by either the
guardian ad litem in recommending, or the judge in facilitating, an adoption are as
follows:
(1) the wishes of the child;
(2) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the applicant to
adopt the child;
(3) the child's need for stability and continuity of relationship with parent
figures;
(4) the wishes of the child's parent as expressed in writing prior to that
parent's execution of a consent or surrender for adoption;
(5) the child's adjustment to his present home, school and community;
(6) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved;
(7) the family ties between the child and the applicant to adopt the child and
the value of preserving family ties between the child and the child's relatives,
including siblings;
(8) the background, race, ethnic heritage, behavior, age and living
arrangements of the applicant to adopt the child;
(9) the criminal background check report presented to the court as part of the
investigation required under Section 6 of this Act.
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 50/15.1 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994); see also ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, § 50/20a (West 1992), which states: "The best interests and
welfare of the person to be adopted shall be of paramount consideration in the
construction and interpretation of this Act." Id.
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parental rights,'42 a state assumes a parental role by making determinations for the welfare and best interests of the child.
The next section of this Article discusses the significance of a state's
parenspatriaerole in each of the above proceedings and identifies three
absolutes which result from the use of the best interests of the child
standard. These absolutes, in turn, form the basis for this Article's
thesis that a state's role as parenspatriaeis inconsistent with its imposition of the juvenile death penalty.
B. The Significance of a State's Broad Parens Patriae Role and the
Use of the Best Interests of the Child Standard
A state's parenspatriaerole and consideration of the best interests of
the child permeate all areas of the law that affect children, including the
juvenile justice system, custody, adoption, and other areas beyond the
scope of this Article. 43 This broad use of a state's parens patriae
authority, coupled with the best interests of the child standard, make
clear the following absolutes.
First, the law recognizes that children are different from adults. For
example, the Supreme Court noted in Bellotti v. Baird'44 that children
are more vulnerable than adults; that they have a greater need for
concern, sympathy, and attention; and that they lack experience, perspective, and judgment. 145 Generally, a state may limit the freedom of
children because of this lack of experience, perspective, and judgment. 141
Second, due to children's inability to make mature decisions, a
state, in its role as parens patriae,assumes the parental responsibility
of protecting children. 147 In this quasi-parental role, a state determines
142. Termination of parental rights can be voluntary, see, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.41 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994) (providing conditions upon which parents can
voluntarily terminate their parental rights), or imposed by the State. Involuntary
termination of parental rights is a separate area of children's law in the context of child
abuse and neglect cases. See Scott A. Cannon, Comment, Finding Their Own "Place to
Be:" What Gregory Kingsley's and Kimberly Mays' "Divorces" From Their Parents
Have Done for Children's Rights, 39 Loy. L. REV. 837, 853-56 (1994) (stating that
most cases of involuntary termination of parental rights are brought by the State, a
guardian, or foster parents, and outlining Florida's involuntary termination law).
143. See, e.g., Indian Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 95-608, § 102(f), 92 Stat. 3072
(1978) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (1988)); UNIFORM RECIPROCAL
ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 381 (1968); REVISED UNIFORM GIFTS TO

MINORS
144.
145.
146.
147.

ACT § 4(b)(c), 8A U.L.A. 375 (1966).
443 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 635 (plurality opinion).
Id. (plurality opinion).
"The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing
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the welfare, treatment, and rehabilitation of a child in the juvenile
justice system'48 and the placement of children in the context of
custody and adoption proceedings. 49 In short, a state protects and
cares for children in every area of juvenile law, other than juvenile
capital punishment.
Third, a state's parens patriae role is ultimately linked to the best
interests of the child standard. Although this standard has met many
valid criticisms, 5 ° the concept of the child's best interests in the
context of the juvenile justice system, custody, and adoption, nevertheless, establishes a framework for analyzing a state's role in
protecting juveniles in general. In all areas of the law, children's interests stand foremost and are balanced against society's other
interests, except when the child is a perpetrator of an "adult" capital
crime.
The following section analyzes and criticizes the juvenile death
penalty and its justifications as conflicting with the best interests of the
child standard. This analysis will show that a state contradicts its
parental role by sentencing children to death. The section then procare to its citizens who are unable.., to care for themselves .
Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
148. See supra part V.A.I.
149. See supra part V.A.2-3.
150. Even though many custody and adoption statutes prescribe distinct criteria for
making a best interests determination, see supra notes 133-38, 141 and accompanying
text, the best interests of the child standard has been criticized as being vague and
general. See Howard, supra note 140, at 503. The standard is also criticized for giving
courts insufficient guidance. See generally GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 112 (asserting
that the law's incapacity to supervise interpersonal relationships and inability to
predict future occurrences limits the effectiveness of the best interests standard in legal
decisionmaking); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody
Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1984) (arguing that the best interests
standard does not give courts sufficiently concrete guidance). Furthermore, the standard
has also. been criticized for giving judges too much discretion. Sanford N. Katz, Foster
ParentsVersus Agencies: A Case Study in the JudicialApplication of "The Best Interests
of the Child" Doctrine,in THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, EMERGENT CONCEPTS IN LAW AND
SOCIETY 244, 254 (Albert E. Wilkerson ed., 1973). Katz states:
[T]he doctrine has no absolute definition. Nor is there uniformity in the
results of the cases in which the doctrine has been applied. In general, all that
can be said is that, as the doctrines of "bona fide purchaser" in the law of real
property and "good faith" in negotiable instruments, so "the best interests of
the child doctrine" is a mandate from the legislature, directing the judge to use
his discretion in making a disposition.
Id. at 254 (footnote omitted). Other critics assert that uniform standards and procedures
are needed to evaluate the interests of all parties involved, including, but not limited to,
the child's. See, e.g., Kom, supra note 126, at 1280 n.8. A detailed examination of the
various criticisms of the best interests of the child standard is beyond the scope of this
analysis.
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poses that both state legislatures and the Supreme Court use the best
interests of the child standard in evaluating the juvenile death penalty.
C. The Juvenile Death Penalty and a State's Role
in ProtectingChildren
A state's parenspatriaeobligations require it to protect its youths. A
state's authority to sentence children to death, completely contravenes
its role as protector of children and its duty to consider the best
interests of the child. The cases of Paula Cooper, Paul Magill, and
Jerome Allen demonstrate the conflict between a state's duty to protect
children and its role in executing them.
In May 1985, Paula Cooper, at age seventeen, became the youngest
female sentenced to death since 1892.151 Cooper was one of four
youths charged in the stabbing murder of a Bible teacher in Gary,
Indiana; 152 she was only fifteen years old when the crime was committed. 5 3 Cooper's case received worldwide attention. Most notably,
more than one million people in Italy participated in a campaign to save
Cooper by collecting signatures, writing
54 letters, and demonstrating at
the United States Embassy in Rome.
Furthermore, although Cooper's sentencing judge opposed the
55
death penalty in general, he nevertheless sentenced her to death.
According to Lake County, Indiana Judge James Kimbrough, sentencing Cooper was the hardest act he had ever done as a judge, and he
did so only because the law required the death penalty under the
circumstances of the case. 156 One commentator noted the judge's
reaction: "Just 30 years ago, he explained at Cooper's trial, the
151. Sharon Cohen, Because of Her Age, Many View Her as a Cause Celebre, Indiana
Girl, 17, One of 35 Awaiting Execution, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1987, at 6.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154.

Amy Linn, Should We Kill Our Children? The Death Penalty Debate, PHILA.

1987, (Magazine), at 12. One letter from Italy stated the following to
Governor Robert Orr of Indiana:
We cannot comprehend how people of a democratic, free and independent
nation-who have fought and continue to fight with courage and self-denial
for the democracy, freedom and independence of other people; who, after the
atrocities of World War II and Nazi concentration camps had the strength to
forgive their enemies, will not grant one of its children a chance to make
amends.
Id.
155. Cohen, supra note 151, at 6.
156. Linn, supra note 154, at 12. "'There was a tremendous personal conflict,'
stated Judge Kimbrough, "'I felt I really had no alternative."' Cohen, supra note 151, at
6 (quoting Judge Kimbrough).
INQUIRER, Oct. 4,
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majority of Americans considered executions barbaric.
But now 'they
' 57
1
death.""
means
them
to
justice
And
justice.
want
Judge Kimbrough's reluctance to sentence Cooper reflects the
conflict between a state's parenspatriae role and its role in carrying out
the juvenile death penalty. In most situations involving juveniles, the
judge acts as protector or quasi-parent. 158 Judge Kimbrough, however, acted as an executioner when he sentenced Cooper under
Indiana's death penalty statute. It is this contradiction, a state on the
one hand protecting the child, and on the other hand sentencing a child
to death, that makes the juvenile death penalty inconsistent with a
state's duty toward children. Ultimately, the Indiana Supreme Court
held the execution of a fifteen-year-old to be cruel and59unusual punishment and overturned Paula Cooper's death sentence.
Another case that depicts the inconsistency between a state's use of
the juvenile death penalty and its duty to safeguard its youths is that of
Paul Magill. Magill was sentenced to death in Florida for rape and
murder when he was seventeen years old. 160 Magill spent the next
eleven years living in maximum security on Florida's death row.' 61 In
62
May 1988, a federal appeals court ordered a resentencing hearing,'

157. Linn, supra note 154, at 12 (quoting Judge Kimbrough).
158. See supra part V.A.
159. Cooper v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1216, 1221 (Ind. 1989). During the time between
Cooper's death sentence and her appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court, the Indiana
statutory scheme changed, establishing sixteen as the minimum age for imposing the
death penalty. Id. at 1219. The fact that Paula Cooper fell into this time gap was one of
the factors the court used in making its determination. Id. at 1219-20.
160. Don Colburn, Growing Up on Death Row; Should Juvenile Killers be Executed?
The Story of Paul Magill, WASH. POST, July 19, 1988, (Health), at Z12. The statutory
scheme in Florida consists of a bifurcated trial, in which the determination of the
defendant's guilt and his penalty are separate proceedings. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141
(West 1985 & Supp. 1995). At the sentencing portion, the jury deliberates and gives an
advisory sentence, which the court may accept or reject. Id. § 921.141(2), (3) (West
1985).
161. Colburn, supra note 160, at ZI2.
162. Magill v. Dugger, 824 F.2d 879, 896 (11th Cir. 1987).
During the
determination of guilt phase of the trial, Paul Magill's lawyer failed to prepare Magill
for direct or cross-examination and met with Magill for the first time 15 minutes before
the trial started. Id. at 887; see supra note 160 for an explanation of the Florida criminal
trial scheme. Magill had a different attorney during the penalty phase, who failed to
present available, potentially mitigating evidence. Magill, 824 F.2d at 889. The
federal appeals court concluded that the deficient representation of counsel during the
guilt phase was not so egregious as to require overturning the conviction. Id. at 888.
The court vacated Magill's death sentence, however, and granted a new sentencing
hearing due to the ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt and penalty phases,
along with the advisory jury's failure in considering nonstatutory mitigating factors.
Id. at 890, 896.
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and a new jury recommended life in prison. 163 The judge, who had
originally sentenced Magill to death, followed the new jury's life imprisonment recommendation." 6
The most striking facet of this account is that Paul Magill spent over
eleven years on death row. According to one author, Magill literally
grew up there. 6 5 While courts in other areas of juvenile law must
decide children's issues relative to their best interests, the Magill court,
acting pursuant to Florida law, caused a child to grow up on death
row. Such action is the antithesis of the action a state should take as
the protector of children and illustrates another inherent flaw in the
juvenile death penalty.
Another revealing case in which the application of the juvenile death
penalty contravened with a state's parental role is that of Jerome Allen.
Sixteen-year-old Allen was convicted of murdering a service station
manager. 66 A Florida jury recommended the death penalty by a
1 67
seven-to-five vote, and the trial judge accepted the recommendation.
According to family members who testified at the trial, Allen had a
troubled childhood and had previously been committed to the county
juvenile detention center. 68 The trial judge apparently took many of
these factors into consideration, but nevertheless imposed the death
169
penalty.

This case poses the puzzle of how a state could, at one point in
Jerome Allen's troubled life, take steps to rehabilitate him through the
juvenile justice system, and then, within months, sentence him to
death. This leap from the juvenile justice system to death row is
illogical at best: How can a civilized society promote the welfare and
163. See Margaret L. Usdansky & Jon Wilson, Killer Wins Judicial Reprieve, ST.
May 7, 1988, at 1.
164. Id.
165. Colburn, supra note 160, at Z12.
166. Allen v. State, 636 So. 2d 494, 496 (Fla. 1994) (per curiam); see Lynne
Bumpus-Hooper, 16-Year-Old with Troubled Past Becomes Youngest on Death Row,
ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Oct. 26, 1991, at Al. Allen was fifteen-years-old at the time
of the murder. Id.
167. Allen, 636 So. 2d at 496. See supra note 160 for an explanation of the Florida
statutory scheme.
168. Allen, 636 So. 2d at 496; see Bumpus-Hooper, supra note 166, at Al. Allen had
been committed to the juvenile detention center for retail theft, battery, and possession
of a short-barrel shotgun. Bumpus-Hooper, supra note 166, at Al. In addition,
according to testimony at the sentencing hearing, Allen's father violently attacked him
on occasion. Allen, 636 So. 2d at 496. Allen also was diagnosed as suffering from
emotional problems, had an Intelligence Quotient of 77, and claimed that he talked to
his dead grandmother. Id.; see also McKinnon, supra note 108, at B5. Furthermore,
Allen's uncle was on death row. Bumpus-Hooper, supra note 166, at Al.
169. Allen, 636 So. 2d at 496.
PETERSBURG TIMES,
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rehabilitation of children at one moment, and execute them the next?
The contradiction works against the traditional role of a state as protector of children.
The Florida Supreme Court has since vacated Jerome Allen's death
sentence. 70 The court held that imposing the death penalty on a child
who committed a crime while under the age of sixteen violates the
Florida Constitution proscription against cruel or unusual punishment.' 7' Mark Oliver, the director of the Children's Advocacy Center
at Florida State University College of Law, described the Florida
Supreme Court's decision in Allen as a "mandate to prosecutors" to
stop wasting their 1time
and taxpayer money by pursuing juvenile
72
punishment.
capital
It is important to recognize that this Article does not intentionally
avoid the issue of the serious nature of the crimes committed by some
juveniles. Paula Cooper and her accomplices stabbed a woman thirtythree times and took ten dollars and the victim's car. 173 According to
one article, Cooper's parents refused to visit her after her conviction,
and many in her hometown "would like to fry her, and the sooner the
better."' 174 Paul Magill held up a convenience store clerk, abducted
her, raped her, and later shot her in the head and chest. 175 Jerome
Allen was found guilty of first-degree murder, armed robbery,
7
possession of a short-barreled shotgun, and grand theft automobile, 1
and showed uncanny stoicism during his trial. 77 As Allen's
prosecuting attorney asserted: "If ever a juvenile deserved the death
penalty, Jerome Allen does."' 7 8 This Article does not dispute the
seriousness of these crimes. What is disputed, however, is the consistency and rationality of the juvenile death penalty, especially as
compared to other areas of juvenile law.

170. Id.
171. Id. at 497. The Florida Constitution prohibits "cruel or unusual" punishment
unlike the United States Constitution which prohibits "cruel and unusual." See FLA.
CONST. art. 1, § 17. The Florida Supreme Court interprets this to mean that alternatives
were intended. Allen, 636 So. 2d at 497 n.5.
172. Lynne Bumpus-Hooper, Court Reverses Death Penalty for Teen: In 50 Years
Florida Has Not Executed Someone Who Was Under 16 When They Committed A Crime,
ORLANDO SENTINEL,

173.
174.

Mar. 25, 1994, (Local and State), at Cl.

Cooper v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1216, 1217 (Ind. 1989).
Linn, supra note 154, at 12.

175. Magill v. Dugger, 824 F.2d 879, 880 (11th Cir. 1987); Colbum, supra note
160, at Z12.
176. Allen, 636 So. 2d at 495.

177. Bumpus-Hooper, supra note 166, at Al.
178. Bumpus-Hooper, supra note 172, at Cl.
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The accounts of Cooper, Magill, and Allen provide insight into the
results of juvenile death penalty statutes. The conflict between state
legislatures promulgating protective statutes for their youth and instituting the juvenile death penalty is a somber paradox. Further, as
evidenced by the Thompson and Stanford decisions, the Supreme
Court considers legislative enactments as indicia of public sentiment
and, thus, rationalizes the imposition of the juvenile death penalty via
the "evolving standards of decency" test. 179 Therefore, the importance
of such statutes cannot be understated. Legislatures should recognize
the inconsistency between enacting laws protecting children and
allowing death penalty statutes to encompass children. In all areas of
the law affecting children, state legislatures need to take into consideration the subject of their legislation.
Therefore, legislatures must reevaluate the imposition of death on
children in the context of this paradox. Criteria truly indicative of our
society's evolving standards of decency must be considered when
promulgating death penalty statutes that include children. In proposing
more accurate criteria for state legislatures, Professor Streib asserts
that, "any legislative body should consider a wide range of criminological, jurisprudential, and political factors in deliberations
concerning the juvenile death penalty issue for their statute and jurisdiction."'' 80 Drawing from this assertion, state legislatures must also
consider a state's parenspatriaeduty and the best interests of the child
in determining whether the juvenile death penalty is an appropriate
response to juvenile crime.
The United States Supreme Court must also readdress the constitutionality of state juvenile death penalty legislation considering the
state's parenspatriae duty.' 8' Justice Scalia, writing for the dissent in
Thompson v. Oklahoma,'8 2 and for the majority in Stanford v.
Kentucky, 83 primarily focused his assessment of society's evolving
standards of decency in relation to the juvenile death penalty on a
consideration of state legislation on the subject. 184 A sound approach
179. See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
180. Victor L. Streib, Excluding Juveniles from New York's Impendent Death
Penalty, 54 ALB. L. REV. 625, 673 (1990).
181. See supra part III.B.
182. 487 U.S. 815, 859 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a discussion of
Thompson, see supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
183. 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (plurality opinion). See supra notes 75-79 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Stanford.
184. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 865-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Stanford, 492 U.S. at
370-73 (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia specifically rejected the use of criteria such as
"public opinion polls, the views of interest groups, and the positions adopted by
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to gauging society's contemporary values, and consequently, the
constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty, must also incorporate a
state's parenspatriaerole and the best interests of the child standard.
Evaluating the "evolving standards of decency"' 85 in the context of the
juvenile death penalty requires an analysis of juvenile law and its
treatment of youths. Such an analysis shows that the public, through
the state legislatures, requires courts to consider the child's best
interests in every other area of juvenile law. The juvenile death penalty
is unconstitutional because it contradicts public opinion as manifested
in juvenile law by excluding a state's parens patriae role and
consideration of the best interests of the child.
VI. CONCLUSION
This analysis has established certain premises. First, in all areas of
the law, children are treated differently from adults. This notion is
grounded on basic presumptions our society makes about juveniles:
they are less mature, less able to make sound judgments, and more
prone to environmental influences than adults.18 6 Second, a state via
its role as parens patriae has the responsibility to protect children by
considering their best interests in all areas of the law. Consequently,
the execution of children conflicts with a state's protective role and
duty. To remedy this conflict, state legislatures must enact legislation
that reflects a state's protective role and abolishes the juvenile death
penalty.
Specifically, as Professor Streib articulates, criminological, jurisprudential, and political factors should be taken into consideration
when promulgating state juvenile death penalty statutes.8 7 As this
analysis indicates, a state's parenspatriae role and the best interests of
the child should also be factored into the constitutional and legislative
analyses as indicators of society's evolving standards of decency.

various professional associations." Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377 (plurality opinion).
Justice Scalia's rejection of these criteria is alarming. It is such criteria that are truly
indicative of the American public's consensus of the juvenile death penalty. These
indicia of public opinion reflect the "evolving standards of decency" set forth by Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958), and were utilized by the plurality in Thompson. See
supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
185. The Court has been criticized for not actually applying the "evolving standards
of decency" determination in the first instance. Dominic J. Riccotta, Eighth
Amendment-The Death Penaltyfor Juveniles: A State's Right or a Child's Injustice?,
79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 921, 939 (1988).
186. See supra note 112.
187. Streib, supra note 180, at 673.
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Further, the United States Supreme Court should recognize the
special treatment of children in all other areas of law and consider this
a reflection of society's evolving standards of decency. States which
factor the parenspatriae role into the juvenile death penalty analysis
would be compelled to conclude that the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty stands on shaky ground.
Unfortunately, a national consensus and a standard for the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty remains elusive. Although the
Supreme Court has determined that juvenile capital punishment statutes
and sentencing juries are sufficient "objective" indicia of public
opinion,"' this is hardly the case. Actually, various indicators of
public sentiment point to the proposition that the majority of Americans
are against the juvenile death penalty. 89 Justice Marshall argued that
punishment that is morally unacceptable or against popular sentiment is
considered invalid.' 90
As evidenced by shocking cases like Yummy Sandifer's, our
society is focusing on juvenile crime and violence and searching for a
solution.' 9 ' Executing our youths is not the answer. As a society, we
must consider the ramifications of killing our youths in relation to the
protective nature of other areas of juvenile law and our duty as a
society to protect our children. Imposing the death penalty on America's youths will not solve the inherent problems of our modem, and
yes, violent society. We must look beyond the easy answers and
search for a true solution to the growing violence surrounding our
youths.
Ultimately, we must reach a standard of juvenile capital punishment
that truthfully reflects society's wishes and interests, while maintaining
consistency with other areas of juvenile law. The best interests of the

188. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377 (plurality opinion).
189. STREIB, supra note 15, at 30-34. Allen v. State, 636 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1994) (per
curiam), gives opponents of the juvenile death penalty some hope in what might be a
trend. The Florida Supreme Court articulated the arbitrariness of the imposition of this
punishment: "We cannot countenance a rule that would result in some young juveniles
being executed while the vast majority of others are not, even where the crimes are
similar." Id. at 497 (footnote omitted). By explaining that the death penalty is rarely
imposed on children under sixteen years of age, the court alluded to the fact that public
sentiment is against the juvenile death penalty and juries are reluctant to impose it. Id.
Ironically, these are the two criteria that Justice Scalia relied upon in Stanford when
gauging public consensus against the death penalty for juveniles. Sanford, 492 U.S. at
361. But see supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text for sources which contend that
public opinion favors the death penalty for children.
190. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 332 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
191. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
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child standard, derived from a state's role as parens patriae, if not
dispositive, is a starting point for such an inquiry.
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APPENDIX A
STATE DEATH PENALTY LAWS

Alabama:

ALA. CODE § 12-15-34 (1994) (allowing transfer

of juveniles at least fourteen years old to adult
courts); ALA. CODE § 12-15-34.1(a)(1) (1994)
(automatically waiving jurisdiction of the juvenile
court for a person who has reached the age of
sixteen and who committed a capital offense); ALA.
CODE § 13A-5-51(7) (1994) (providing that the age
of the defendant may be a mitigating factor in
sentencing).
Arizona:

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)(5) (1993)
(providing no minimum age for imposition of the
death penalty).

Arkansas:

ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318 (Michie 1987 &
Supp. 1993) (allowing transfer to adult court at
fourteen for a capital murder offense).

California:

CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988) (defining

circumstances under which a defendant may be
subject to the death penalty); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.5(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995) (providing
eighteen as the minimum age for imposition of the
death penalty).
Colorado:

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-11-802(1)(a),
(4)(a) (West Supp. 1994) (providing eighteen as
the minimum age for imposition of the death
penalty).

Connecticut:

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(g)(1) (West
1994) (providing eighteen as the minimum age for
imposition of the death penalty).

Delaware:

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(c) (1987 & Supp.
1994) (providing no minimum age for imposition
of the death penalty).
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Florida:

FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 921.141(6)(g), 921.142(7)(f)
(West 1985 & Supp. 1995) (providing no minimum age for imposition of the death penalty).

Georgia:

GA. CODE ANN. § 17-9-3 (1990) (providing
seventeen as the minimum age for imposition of the
death penalty); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)
(1990) (providing for consideration of mitigating
factors in sentencing).

Idaho:

IDAHO CODE § 19-2515(c) (1987) (providing no
minimum age for imposition of the death penalty).

Illinois:

ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 720, § 5/9-1(b) (West
1992) (requiring the defendant to have reached the
age of eighteen before imposing a sentence of
death).

Indiana:

IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-3(b) (West Supp.
1994) (requiring a defendant to have reached the
age of sixteen before imposing the death penalty);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(c)(7) (West Supp.
1994) (establishing that the defendant's youth is a
mitigating factor).

Kansas:

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4622 (Supp. 1/914)
(prohibiting the execution of any defendant who
was less than eighteen years of age at the time of
the crime).

Kentucky:

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(b)(8)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990) (providing that the
defendant's youth at the time of the crime is a
mitigating factor); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
640.040(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990 & Supp.
1994) (prohibiting the death penalty for defendants
who have not reached the age of sixteen).
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Louisiana:

LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5(f) (West
1984) (providing that the defendant's youth at the
time of the crime is a mitigating factor); LA.
CHILDREN'S CODE ANN. art. 305 (West 1984) as
amended by Act of July 6, 1994, 1994 La. Sess.
Law Serv. 15 (West) (requiring a juvenile to be
transferred to adult court when he or she has
reached the age of fifteen and there is probable
cause to believe that he or she committed first or
second degree murder).

Maryland:

MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 412(f) (1992)
(prohibiting the death penalty for children under the
age of eighteen years old); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 413(g)(5) (Supp. 1994) (providing
that the defendant's youth at the time of the crime is
a mitigating factor).

Mississippi:

MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-157(1) (Supp. 1994)
(allowing any child who has reached the age of
thirteen to be transferred to adult court); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(6)(g) (1994) (providing
that the defendant's youth at the time of the crime is
a mitigating factor). The Department of Justice
notes that the Mississippi Attorney General's office
recognizes that the effective age for imposition of
the juvenile death penalty is sixteen, as set by the
U.S. Supreme Court, see BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
BULLETIN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 6 (1993).

Missouri:

Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.020 (Vernon Supp. 1994)
(prohibiting the death penalty for adolescents who
are under the age of sixteen); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 565.032(3)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1994) (providing
that the defendant's youth at the time of the crime is
a mitigating factor).
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Montana:

MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-304(7) (1989)
(providing that defendant's age, if under eighteen,
is a mitigating factor); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18305 (1993) (allowing the death penalty only if there
are "no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency").

Nebraska:

NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01 (1989) (prohibiting
the death penalty for persons under eighteen years
of age); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(d) (1989)
(providing that the defendant's youth at the time of
the crime is a mitigating factor).

Nevada:

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.025 (Michie 1992)
(prohibiting the death penalty for persons under
sixteen years of age); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 200.035(6) (Michie 1992) (providing that the defendant's youth at the time of the crime is a
mitigating factor).

New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VI)(d) (Supp.
1994) (providing age as a mitigating factor in
sentencing, but prohibiting the death penalty for
persons under eighteen years of age).
New Jersey:

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(g) (West Supp. 1994)
(prohibiting the death penalty for a juvenile tried as
an adult); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(5)(c)
(West Supp. 1994) (providing that the defendant's
age is a mitigating factor in sentencing).

New Mexico:

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-14(A) (Michie 1994)
(prohibiting the death penalty for persons who have
not yet reached the age of majority); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-20A-6(I) (Michie 1994) (providing that
age is a mitigating factor in sentencing).
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North Carolina:

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1994) (prohibiting the death penalty for persons under the age
of seventeen unless the person was incarcerated for
murder when the subsequent murder occurred);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(7) (Supp. 1994)
(providing that age is a mitigating factor in sentencing).

Ohio:

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(1)
(Anderson 1993) (prohibiting the death penalty for
persons under the age of eighteen); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)(4) (Anderson 1993)
(providing that the defendant's youth at the time of
the crime is a mitigating factor).

Oklahoma:

OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 1104.2(A) (Supp. 1995)
(providing that any person sixteen or seventeen
years of age charged with murder will be considered an adult).

Oregon:

OR. REV. STAT. § 161.620 (Supp. 1994)
(requiring the defendant to have reached the age of
eighteen before imposition of the death penalty);
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(c)(A) (Supp. 1994)
(providing that age is a mitigating factor).

Pennsylvania:

42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(e)(4) (1982)
(providing that age is a mitigating factor, but not
establishing a minimum age for imposition of the
death penalty).

South Carolina:

S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(7) (Law. Coop. Supp. 1993) (providing that age is a mitigating
factor, but not establishing a minimum age for
imposition of the death penalty).

South Dakota:

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-1 (Supp.
1994) (providing no minimum age for imposition
of the death penalty).
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Tennessee:

TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-134(a)(1) (Supp. 1994)
(prohibiting the death penalty for juveniles
transferred from juvenile to adult court); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-13-2040)(7) (Supp. 1994) (providing that the defendant's age is a mitigating
factor).

Texas:

TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 2(e) (West
Supp. 1995) (providing that age is a mitigating
factor); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.07(d) (West
1994) (prohibiting the death penalty for persons
under seventeen years of age).

Utah:

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(3)(e) (Supp. 1994)
(providing that youth is a mitigating factor, but not
establishing a minimum age for imposition of the
death penalty).

Virginia:

VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-269.1 (Michie Supp.
1994) (allowing transfer to adult court when the
defendant is at least fourteen).

Washington:

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
Supp. 1995) (providing that
factor in sentencing, but not
mum age for imposition of the

Wyoming:

WYO. STAT. § 6-2-101(b) (Supp. 1994) (prohibiting the death penalty for children under the age
of sixteen).

10.95.070(7) (West
age is a mitigating
establishing a minideath penalty).

